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This paper considers risk sharing among individuals within and across regions in a federation with 
population mobility and infinite horizons. It is shown that the regional authorities will not fully 
exploit gains from inter-regional risk sharing when population mobility is imperfect. However, in the 
Nash equilibrium there is complete risk sharing among the individuals within each region, which 
corresponds to the policies of the central authority. Regional authorities who care about their 
reputation may be able to commit to an efficient allocation. It is possible that improvements in the 
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I. Introduction 
  There has long been an interest in Canada, and more recently in the European Union (EU), on 
issues pertaining to a federation with a mobile population. One class of models that can be used to 
discuss such issues is the fiscal externality economy, which involves multiple jurisdictions and a 
freely mobile population in a static setting with no uncertainty.
1  In this setting there is need for 
inter-regional transfers in order to obtain an efficient distribution of population in the federation. 
Flatters, Henderson and Mieszkowski (1974), and Boadway and Flatters (1982) argued that these 
transfers should be administered by a central authority. Recently, however, Myers (1990) and 
Mansoorian and Myers (1993) (henceforth referred to as MM) have shown that in the fiscal 
externality economy with two regions the regional authorities will make the inter-regional transfers 
that are necessary for efficiency. Thus, in that environment there is no efficiency role for a central 
authority. The central authority's role is to decide on the degree of redistribution in the federation. 
    The MM model allows for imperfect population mobility by assuming that individuals in 
the economy derive different degrees of non-pecuniary benefits from residing in the two regions that 
form the federation (attachment to home). This is a realistic characterization of a federation 
consisting of culturally diverse communities, and allows a discussion of the importance of the degree 
of population mobility on the equilibrium. 
  An important implication of the MM results is that their model needs to be extended in 
various directions in order to identify the genuine sources of inefficiency in a federation with a 
mobile population. Their model has been extended by Burbidge and Myers (1994a) to include capital 
tax competition, and by Wellisch (1994) to include spillouts of public goods.   The purpose of the 
present paper is to construct the model of a federation in an infinite horizon setting with stochastic 
technological shocks in order to discuss the possible risk sharing arrangements in a federation..   
  The role of risk sharing arrangements in a federation has recently been discussed by Persson 
and Tabellini (1996a, b). In particular, in their (1996a) paper, they construct the model of a 
federation with two regions, and an immobile population. They have an endowment economy in 
                         
1Hercowitz and Pines (1991) provide an interesting exception to this.   2
which each individual faces a probability of having a positive endowment (employed) and a 
probability of having no endowments (unemployed). The unemployment rate in the two regions are 
stochastic and independent of each other. There is, therefore, scope for risk sharing among 
individuals within each region (intra-regional risk sharing) and among individuals across regions 
(inter-regional risk sharing). They abstract completely from private financial markets.
2 The  regional 
authorities affect the degree of intra-regional risk sharing through their tax/transfer policies, and also 
decide on the provision of local public goods which affects the probability of having a smaller 
unemployment rate in their region. The federal authorities, on the other hand, decide on the degree of 
inter-regional risk sharing through their tax/transfer policies. Regional policies are decided by the 
voters in each region, while the federal policies are decided by all the voters in the federation. 
Persson and Tabellini compare and contrast the political equilibria with various constitutional 
arrangements!for example, whether all voting takes place simultaneously, or whether votes on 
federal policies are taken before the votes on regional policies, and so on.   
  These political economy considerations are swept aside in the present paper. I consider a 
stripped down version of the Persson and Tabellini model with the following important modifications, 
which make it more akin to the models in the fiscal federalism literature. For simplicity, I abstract 
from public goods. Unlike Persson and Tabellini, I assume that there is imperfect population mobility, 
as in MM. Endowments of the lucky in each region are assumed to be decreasing in the population 
size in that region. In the static version of the model, congestion effects, together with free mobility, 
induce the regional authorities to make voluntary inter-regional transfers.
3  In the present model, the 
                         
2There is a large literature in Macroeconomics which has modeled incomplete markets endogenously, by 
explicitly introducing financial intermediaries with costly state verification. Gertler (1988) provides a 
comprehensive survey of this literature. Gertler and Rogoff (1990) construct a two country model with 
financial intermediaries in order to discus the often reported sub-optimal allocation of capital between the 
rich and poor countries. An important finding of this literatures is that modelling incomplete markets 
tends to substantially complicate the analysis. Instead of working through the complicated interaction 
between fiscal policies and endogenous market incompleteness, Persson and Tabellini (1996a, p. 625, and 
1996b, p. 984) close the financial markets.   
3    In fiscal federalism models, it is the diminishing marginal productivity of labour together with free 
mobility that is the main inducement for interregional transfers; because in the absence of such transfers 
the rich region will have an inefficiently large population size. In the static version of the present model, 
with endowments, congestion together with free mobility acts in a similar way.   3
regional authorities are allowed to decide on the degree of inter-regional risk sharing, because they 
are allowed to make voluntary inter-regional transfers. Finally, the infinite horizon allows a 
discussion of the role of reputation in inducing the regional authorities to implement a set of efficient 
policies; and it facilitates discussion of the effects of improvements in the degree of population 
mobility on the possibility of efficient outcomes. 
  At the beginning of each period, before the state of productivity in each region is revealed, 
the regional authorities announce their policies contingent on the states of nature. These are the 
tax/transfer policies which determine the degree of risk sharing among individuals in each region, 
and also the inter-regional transfers contingent on the states of nature. After the levels of productivity 
in the two regions are revealed, the individuals in the economy decide where to reside, and the 
policies that were announced are carried out. It is shown that the regional authorities provide the 
efficient (full) degree of risk sharing among the individuals within their regions (intra-regional risk 
sharing), regardless of the degree of population mobility. Inter-regional risk sharing requires a 
coordinated set of state contingent transfers that flow from one region to another in some states, and 
vice versa in other states. With imperfect population mobility, the regional authorities disagree over 
the sizes of these state contingent transfers. Since each regional authority chooses the transfers in the 
states in which it experiences a more favourable shock, the disagreement among them precludes 
coordination of these state contingent transfers that are necessary for socially optimal risk sharing. 
However, with perfect mobility there are no disagreements over inter-regional redistribution, and all 
gains from risk sharing are fully exploited. 
  In a recent paper Burbidge and Myers (1994b) consider a model in which there are two types 
of individuals with different abilities, and perfect mobility by individuals of each type. In their model, 
the regional authorities disagree over the degree of redistribution between the more able and less able 
individuals, without any reference to whether these individuals have a preference for residing in any 
particular region:
4  they are concerned with intra-regional redistribution. They show that 
                         
4    Indeed, in their model, with perfect mobility, in equilibrium every individual of each type is indifferent 
between living in either region.   4
disagreement over intra-regional redistribution will lead to inefficiency even in a deterministic 
environment.  
  On the other hand, in the attachment-to-home model the regional authorities disagree over the 
degree of redistribution between the individuals according to their attachments to the regions; each 
regional authority has a preference for individuals more attached to that region. Hence, in the 
attachment-to-home model the focus is on inter-regional redistribution. This was the main focus of 
Mansoorian and Myers (1992). There, it was emphasised that there is a need to introduce imperfect 
mobility into the standard fiscal externality economy. Otherwise, with free mobility the same level of 
utility will prevail throughout the federation and the regional authorities will not disagree over the 
distribution of resources in the federation, eliminating any role for a central authority (Myers (1990)). 
The attachment-to-home model led the regional authorities to disagree over the distribution of 
resources in the federation. It was shown that this disagreement over inter-regional redistribution 
will not lead to inefficiency in the deterministic environment with two regions. In the present paper, 
it is shown that disagreements over inter-regional redistribution will lead to inefficiency in a 
stochastic environment.   
  The infinite horizon setting facilitates a discussion of the possibility of the regional 
authorities signing contracts to implement an efficient set of policies. The reason is that, then, unlike 
in the static setting, one can discuss sanctions which can be imposed on a regional authority if it 
breaks the contract, even in the absence of a central authority. Consider the simplest reputation game 
in which if one region does not implement the policies specified in the contract it suffers sanctions 
imposed by the other region by never again enjoying its cooperation. Also, suppose the efficient 
allocation under consideration is the one that places equal weights on the objectives of the regional 
authorities. In that case, in a symmetric model, a regional authority will have to make a transfer to the 
other region only if it has experienced a more favourable shock. Once such a state is revealed the 
region will make the necessary transfers voluntarily if the present value of the losses it suffers if it 
loses reputation (i.e., the present value of its gains from risk sharing) are larger than the instantaneous 
gains from not making the transfers. It is not possible to say a priori whether improvements in the   5
degree of population mobility will make such commitments more likely.   
  The paper is organised as follows. The static version of the model is discussed in sections II 
and III. The infinite horizon version of the model is discussed in section IV. Some concluding 
remarks are made in section V. 
 
   II. The Static Model with Decentralisation 
  The federation consists of two regions, indexed by i (i=1, 2). I consider an endowment 
economy which has much in common with that used by Persson and Tabellini. pi is the fraction of 
the population in region i that are lucky and receive R(Ni) units of the good, where Ni is the 
population size in the region and RN(@ )<0.
5 (1!pi) is the fraction of the population in the region that 
are unlucky and receive nothing.   
 Assume  that  pi can take one of two values, ( or $, with (>$. The state of nature is denoted by 
(p1, p2). There are two possible states: ((, $) with probability B((, $), and ($, () with probability B($, 
(). Of course, B((, $)+B($, ()=1. Henceforth, for any variable z that depends on (p1, p2) we will 
denote  =  z(p1, p2).  
  The sequence of events is as follows. First, the regional authorities announce their policies 
contingent on the states of nature. These are the tax/transfer policies that determine the degree of risk 
sharing among individuals in each region, and also the inter-regional transfers contingent on the 
states of nature. Then, the pi are chosen by nature. After this, events (i)!(iii) take place 
simultaneously, in analogy with the deterministic model: (i) individuals decide where to reside; (ii) a 
fraction pi of the population that decide to reside in region i becomes lucky, a fraction 1!pi become 
unlucky; and (iii) the policies that were promised are implemented. 
  Population size in the federation is normalised to unity. Thus, in each state (p1, p2) we have   
1 + 2 = 1.    (1) 
  Intra-regional risk sharing in each region i is determined by the regional authority's choice of 
the consumption of the lucky (i) and the unlucky (i ) in different states, through the appropriate 
tax/transfer policies. Inter-regional risk sharing, on the other hand, is determined by their choices of 
                         
5Persson and Tabellini, on the other hand, assume that R(Ni)=1 œ Ni. The assumption RN(@)<0 captures the 
notion of congestion. Its role in the present model was discussed in the Introduction, and is worked out in 
footnote 9 below.   6
the state contingent inter-regional transfers. The transfers from region i to region j in each state (p1, 
p2) are denoted by i.  
  In each state (p1, p2) region i has the resource constraint   
ipiR(i) = ipii + (1!pi)ii + i - j, (2) 
where the left hand side is total endowments in region i in that state, while the elements on the right 
hand side are, respectively, total consumption by the lucky, total consumption by the unlucky, 
transfers paid to the other region, and transfers received from the other region. 
  Next, consider the determination of the distribution of population in the federation. Suppose 
state (p1, p2) is given. Then for any individual residing in region i there is a probability pi that he will 
be lucky and receive a consumption of i. There is also a probability (1!pi) that the same individual 
will be unlucky, and have a consumption of i. The utility individuals derive from consuming x units 
of the good is given by U(x), which is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. Thus, the 
expected value of U(@ ) for any individual residing in region i, conditional on (p1, p2), is   
Vi(p1, p2) = piU(i) + (1!pi)U(i). (3) 
  To discuss the implications of the degree of population mobility, I assume that, as in MM, 
individuals derive non-pecuniary benefits from residing in the two regions. They are, moreover, 
heterogeneous only with respect to their degrees of attachment to the two regions. There is one 
individual of each type, denoted by n, and individuals are distributed uniformly over the interval [0, 
1]. Individual n will derive a non-pecuniary benefit of k(1!n) if he resides in region 1, and kn if he 
resides in region 2. k measures the degree of population mobility: k=0 implies perfect mobility, and 
k=4 implies no mobility.
6 
  After the state (p1, p2) is revealed the total expected utility for individual n will be 1+k(1!n) if 
he resides in region 1, and 2+kn if he resides in region 2. Individuals are free to choose their region of 
residence. Thus, in equilibrium, after (p1, p2) is revealed, there will be one individual, denoted by , 
that will be indifferent between living in either region. For this marginal individual we will have   
                         
6  Myers  and  Papageorgiou  (1997)  introduce imperfect mobility through pecuniary migration costs. The 
attachment-to-home model is a much more tractable means of introducing imperfect mobility.   7
1 + k(1!) = 2 + k.    (4) 
All individuals with n< will choose to reside in region 1, while all others will reside in region 2. 
Hence, from (1), we will have   
1=, and 2=1!.  (5) 
 Now,  (p1, p2) is ((, $) with probability B((, $) and ($, () with probability B($,(). Hence, 
using (3), the unconditional expected value of U(@ ) for any individual who resides in region i in both 
states of nature (referred to as a permanent resident of region i) will be 
func { W sub i `` =`` pi ( gamma , ` beta ) `` V sub i    ( gamma , ` beta ) `` + ``    pi ( beta    , `   
gamma ) `` V sub i    (    beta , ` gamma    ) .}     (6) 
  I assume that the objective of the regional authority i is to 
maximize Wi by choosing the optimal degrees of intra- and inter-regional risk sharing. There are 
various objective functions one can use in this model with heterogeneous agents. For example, one 
can maximize the sum of the utilities of all the agents in the region, or the average utility of all the 
agents in the economy, or total land rents. Maximizing Wi is the simplest objective function 
compared to these alternatives, and it allows me to compare my results with those of MM, where the 
regional authorities also maximize the part of the utility of their residents that is from consumption 
alone.
7  
                         
7    Mansoorian and Myers (1997) compare and contrast the implications of these alternative objective 
function in a deterministic setting. 
  Moreover, in the two extreme cases of no attachment (k=0) and complete attachment (k=4) 
we really have a model with homogeneous agents in each region. Thus, in these cases, Wi is the most 
sensible objective function, because by maximizing Wi regional authority i will be maximizing the 
utility of everyone in its region. A slightly weaker version of this argument can be extended to the 
more general case in which 0<k<4, as discussed in footnote 8 below.       
  The problem of regional authority i is to choose i, i, and i to maximize Wi subject to its   8
resource constraint (2), the migration equilibrium conditions (4), and condition (5) for all (p1, p2). In 
addition, it has the constraint i$0, which prevents it from forcing the other region to make transfers to 
it. To perform this optimisation problem, first solve (2) for i, substitute the result into (3), and use (5) 
to eliminate i, to obtain i as a function of i, i, j, and . Then substitute for i into (6) to obtain Wi as a 
function of the same variable.   
  The optimality conditions for this problem are 
func {    { partial W sub i } over {partial c tilde sub i} `` + `` {partial W_i} over {partial N    tilde } ` 
{ partial N    tilde } over {partial c tilde sub i}`` = ``0,    ~~~ forall~ (p sub 1, `` p sub 2 ), 
 
}    (7) 
func  {  {  partial  W  sub  i  }  over  {partial  S  tilde  sub  i  }  ``  +  ``  {partial 
W_i} over {partial N tilde } ` { partial N  tilde } over {partial S 
tilde sub i } `` <= `` 0, ~~~~ S tilde sub i `` >= `` 0, ~~~~ a n d  }  
 (8) 
func { left \[` { partial W sub i } over {partial S tilde sub i } `` 
+ `` {partial W_i} over {partial N  tilde } ` { partial N tilde } over 
{partial S tilde sub i } ` right \] ``S tilde sub i `` = `` 0, ~~~~ 
forall (p sub 1 , `` p sub 2 ).  }(9) 
  The migration responses that appear in these conditions are 
obtained  from  (4).  As  discussed  above,  i can be expressed as a function of i, i, j, and . 
Hence, for each state (p1, p2), (4) describes    as an implicit function of i, and i (i=1, 2). Totally 
differentiating it, we obtain   
func { { partial N tilde } over {partial c tilde    sub 1 } `` = `` - `` 
{ p sub 1 `` left \[ ` U'( c tilde sub 1 )  `` -`` U' ( b tilde sub 
1 ) right \]} over { line `` J tilde `` line }  
, } 
    (10) 
func { { partial N tilde } over {partial c tilde  sub 2 } `` =  ``{ p 
sub 2 `` left \[ ` U'( c tilde sub 2 )  `` -`` U' ( b tilde sub 2 ) 
right \]} over { line `` J tilde `` line }  
, } 
    (11) 
and 
func  {  {  partial  N  tilde  }  over  {partial  S  tilde  sub  1  }  ``  =  ``-  `{  partial 
N tilde } over {partial S tilde sub 2 } `` = ``  
{  U'( b tilde sub 1 ) / N tilde `` + ``  U' ( b tilde sub 2 ) / (1`-`N 
tilde )} over { line `` J tilde `` line }  
, } 
    (12) 
where  ,  ,  is  the  determinant  of  the  Jacobian  of  the  migration  equilibrium 
in a particular state (p1, p2), and should be negative for stability (as in Boadway (1982)).   9
We have ,  , = 1!2!2k,  where   
func { Lambda tilde sub 1 `` =`` {partial V tilde sub 1 } over {partial N tilde } ``= ``      U'( b tilde 
sub 1 )`` left \[` p sub 1 ` psi ' ( N tilde ) `` + `` {S tilde sub 1 `` - ``S tilde sub 2 } over {N tilde sup 2} 
right \]   
}    (13) 
and   
func  {Lambda  tilde  sub  2  ``  =``  {partial  V  tilde  sub  2  }  over  {  partial 
N  tilde  }``=``   U'( b  tilde  sub  2  )``  left  \[`-`  p  sub  2  `  psi  '  (  1`-`N 
tilde ) `` + `` {S tilde sub 1 `` - `` S tilde sub 2 } over {(1`-`N 
tilde ) sup 2} right \] . 
}(14) 
  Substituting from (10) and (11) into (7), noting that  
func { { partial W sub i } / {partial c tilde sub i} `` = `` pi tilde 
` p sub i `` left\[ U'( c tilde sub i ) `` - `` U'( b tilde sub i )` 
right \]  } 
 and MWi/M=i, we can show that   
i = i   for  all  (p1, p2),    (i = 1, 2).    (15) 
Hence, in the Nash equilibrium we will have complete risk sharing among the individuals within 
each region, regardless of the degree of population mobility (i.e., regardless of the value of k). 
  To work out the degree of inter-regional risk sharing in the Nash equilibrium substitute from 
(12) into (8), noting that   
func { { partial W sub i } /{partial S tilde sub i } `` = ``{ -` pi 
tilde } over {N tilde sub i}  ` U'( b tilde sub i ) , } 
 to  obtain  
func{ {Lambda tilde sub 1 } over { 1 `` - `` N tilde } `` {U'( b tilde sub 2 ) }    `` + `` {    Lambda 
tilde sub 2}    over {N tilde } `{U'( b tilde sub 1 ) ~ >= ~ {- 2k U'( b tilde sub 1 ) } over {N tilde } , } } 
 (16) 
and 1$0 œ (p1, p2) for region 1, and   
func{ {Lambda tilde sub 1 } over { 1 `` - `` N tilde } `` {U'( b tilde sub 2 ) }    `` + `` {    Lambda 
tilde sub 2}    over { N tilde }    `{U'( b tilde sub 1 ) ~ <= ~ { 2kU'( b tilde sub 2 ) } over {1``-``N 
tilde  }  ,  }  }   (17) 
and  2$0 œ (p1, p2) for region 2.
8          At this point it is important to point out that by maximizing i when 
the state of nature is revealed the regional authority i will be maximizing the utility of everyone who ends 
                         
8As is well known, in dynamic settings it is possible that promises made by the government may not be 
implemented. Such time inconsistency problems come about because promises influence the behaviour of 
the private agents by affecting their expectations. Hence, once the expectations are formed the 
government's constraints are modified. The policies we have derived here are time consistent. To see this 
note that once (p1, p2) is revealed regional authority i will be maximizing i, subject to (2), (4), (5), and i$0, 
by choosing i, i, and i for that particular state. As MWi/M=Mi/M, for any variable    in state (p1, p2) conditions 
(7)!(9) will hold for all i after (p1, p2) is revealed. 
 
   10
up living in that region. The reason is that the non-pecuniary part of utility is a parameter in an agent's 
utility function. This, then, gives us another justification for employing Wi as the objective function of the 
regional authority i. 
,  9 
  Our next task is to determine whether the central authority can offer a degree of intra- and 
inter-regional risk sharing that will increase the value of the objective function of at least one 
regional authority without reducing the other.   
III. The Planner's Problem in the Static Model 
  The central authority will choose 1, 2, 1, 2, and the net transfers from region 1 to 2,    (/ 1!2), 
in order to maximize a weighted sum of the objectives of the two regional authorities, *W1+(1!*)W2 
for *0[0,1], subject to (2), (4) and (5) for all (p1, p2).   
  As discussed above, using (2), (3), (5) and (6), Wi can be expressed as a function of i, i, j, and . 
Thus, the optimality conditions for this problem can be written as: 
func { delta `` left \[ ` { partial W sub 1 } over {partial c tilde sub i} `` + `` {partial W_1} over 
{partial N    tilde } ` { partial N    tilde } over {partial c tilde sub i}` right \] `` + `` (1 `` -`` delta) `` 
left \[ ` { partial W sub 2 } over {partial c tilde sub i} `` + `` {partial W_2} over {partial N    tilde } ` 
{ partial N    tilde } over {partial c tilde sub i } ` right \] `` = ``0,    ~~~ (i `` = `` 1, `` 2) ~~~ forall~ 
(p sub 1, `` p sub 2 ), 
}    (18) 
and 
func { delta `` left \[ ` { partial W sub 1 } over {partial S tilde } 
`` + `` {partial W_1} over {partial N tilde } ` { partial N  tilde } 
over {partial S tilde } ` right \] `` + `` (1``- delta)  `` left \[ ` 
{ partial W sub 2 } over {partial S tilde } `` + `` {partial W_2 } 
over {partial N tilde } ` { partial N  tilde } over {partial S tilde } 
` right \]`` = `` 0, ~~~ ~ forall (p sub  1 , `` p sub 2 ).  }  
 (19) 
 Substituting  from  (10)  and  (11)  into  (18),  noting  that  MWi/M=i, MWi/Mj=0 
for j…i, and   
func { { partial W sub i } / {partial c tilde sub i} `` = `` pi tilde 
` p sub i `` left\[ U'( c tilde sub i ) `` - `` U'( b tilde sub i )` 
right \]  } 
, it can be shown that i=i (i=1,2) for all (p1, p2). Hence, with the central authority, as in the Nash 
                         
9In the Introduction I discussed the role played by the assumption RN<0. At this point note that if RN=0 
then from (13) and (14) at 1=2=0 we will have 1=2=0, and so MWi/M=i=0. Now MWi/Mi=!UN(bi)/i<0. Thus, if 
RN=0 then, from (8) and (9), no transfers will be made by either region in any state.   11
equilibrium, we will have complete risk sharing among individuals in both regions. 
  Now substitute from (12) into (19), and use the fact that   
func { { partial W sub 1 } /{partial S tilde  } `` = ``{ -` pi tilde } 
over {N tilde }  ` U'( b tilde sub 1 )  } 
 and 
func { { partial W sub 2 } /{partial S tilde  } `` = ``{ ` pi tilde } 
over {1 `` -`` N tilde }  ` U'( b tilde sub 2 )  } 
 to  obtain    
func{ {Lambda tilde sub 1 } over { 1 `` - `` N tilde } `` {U'( b tilde sub 2 ) }    `` + `` {    Lambda 
tilde sub 2}    over {N tilde } `{U'( b tilde sub 1 ) ~ = ~ delta `` {- 2k U'( b tilde sub 1 ) } over { N   
tilde } `` + `` (1``- delta)    `` { 2k U'( b tilde sub 2 ) } over {1``-``N tilde } }    ~~~~ forall ~    (p sub 
1 , `` p sub 2 ).    }   (20) 
 This  is  not  consistent  with  (16)  and  (17)  for  all  (p1, p2) when population 
is only imperfectly mobile (i.e., when k>0). To see this suppose, for simplicity, that in state ((, $) 
region 1 makes a transfer to region 2, because region 1 has experienced a more favourable shock 
(recall that (>$). Thus, in that state (16) will hold with equality, and (17) with inequality. By the 
symmetry of the model, it follows that, then, in state ($, () region 2 will be making a transfer to 1. 
Thus, in that state (17) will hold with equality and (16) with inequality. There is no * that will be 
consistent with these results. If *=1 then (20) will be consistent with (16) and (17) in state (( , $), but 
not in state ($, (). Similarly, if *=0 then (20) will be consistent with (16) and (17) in state ($, (), but 
not in ((, $). Finally, if 0<*<0 then (20) will be inconsistent with (16) in state ((, $) and inconsistent 
with (17) in ($, ().
10,  11 
  To see the reason for inefficiency in the Nash equilibrium first note that inter-regional risk 
sharing and inter-regional redistribution are inextricably linked. Inter-regional redistribution involves 
inter-regional transfers that are independent of the state (p1, p2), and are designed to increase the 
                         
10If in the Nash equilibrium no region makes a transfer in either state, then (16) and (17) will hold with 
strict inequalities in all states. It is clear that for each state we will be able to find a 0<*<0 such that (20) 
will hold for that particular state at the Nash equilibrium allocation. However, the *'s that we would 
require for different states will not be the same, again because there will be a coordination failure, as the 
regional authorities disagree over the degree of interregional redistribution. 
11The extreme case of no population mobility (k=4) will further illustrate the point. In that case the 
migration responses (12) will all be zero. Thus, as MWi/Mi<0, from (8) and (9), we will have 1=2=0, for all 
(p1, p2), and no interregional risk sharing. However, by the symmetry of the model we know that 
complete interregional risk sharing will be a Pareto superior allocation.   12
expected utility in one region at the expense of the other. Inter-regional risk sharing, on the other 
hand, involves transfers that are contingent on the state, and are, moreover, coordinated across states. 
The regional authorities do not have the instruments to coordinate their state contingent inter-regional 
transfers. 
  With attachment, regional authorities disagree over the degree of inter-regional redistribution. 
To see this, abstract completely from inter-regional risk sharing by considering a world in which 
there is only one possible state (p1, p2). Then the problem of region 1 will be to maximize V1 subject 
to (4), and the other constraints. Region 1 will thus, in effect, be maximizing V2+2kN!k. On the 
other hand, region 2 will be maximizing V2. Clearly, region 1 will desire a larger N than region 2.   
In such a world the degree of inter-regional redistribution in the Nash equilibrium will be determined 
by the rich region alone, through its choice of the transfer. In that environment, strategic interaction 
will not result in an inefficient outcome essentially because the poor region is passive in the game (it 
is constrained by Si$0).
12  (See MM, p. 129, for a full discussion.)     
  On the other hand, in a world with more than one possible state of nature we need some 
coordinated state contingent transfers in order to exploit gains from inter-regional risk sharing. In the 
present, symmetric, model the state contingent transfers should flow from region 1 to 2 in state ((, $) 
(when in the Nash equilibrium the expected marginal utility of consumption in region 1 is lower), 
and from 2 to 1 in state ($,() (when in the Nash equilibrium the expected marginal utility of 
consumption in region 2 is lower). As the regional authorities disagree over the degree of 
inter-regional redistribution in the federation, they disagree over the sizes of these transfers in 
different states. Each region determines the size of the transfer in the state in which it experiences a 
more favourable shock than the other region. Thus, the authorities' disagreement over inter-regional 
redistribution leads to a failure to coordinate the state contingent transfers, and, as a result, some 
                         
12With only one state of nature we can always choose a *0[0,1] such that (20) is satisfied, and is 
consistent with (16) and (17), at the Nash equilibrium allocation. If in the Nash equilibrium region 1 
makes a transfer then we set *=1; and    if region 2 makes a transfer then *=0. If in the Nash equilibrium 
neither region makes a transfer then we can choose a 0<*<1.   13
gains from inter-regional risk sharing are not exploited.
13  
  The regional authorities cannot sign contracts amounting to trading in state contingent claims 
in order to overcome this problem. This is because they will not honour such contracts once the state 
of nature is revealed (see footnote 8). To fully appreciate the reason for this it is important first to be 
clear on the difference between contracts signed by private individuals and contracts signed by 
governments (the regional authorities). With contracts signed by private individuals we assume that 
heavy sanctions will be imposed by governments if an individual repudiates a contract. It is this 
threat of sanctions by governments that prevents default by private individuals, even though these 
contracts are the outcome of free markets. The main problem with contracts signed by regional 
authorities is that for them to be honoured there must be a powerful central authority to impose heavy 
sanctions in case of repudiation. In deriving the decentralised equilibrium we have followed the 
literature and assumed away such a powerful central authority.
14  (The role of contracts between the 
regional authorities, and sanctions in case of repudiation will be taken up in the next section.)
15  
                         
13As pointed out in the Introduction, Burbidge and Myers (1994b) consider a model in which there are two 
types of individuals with different abilities. In their deterministic model there is perfect mobility by 
individuals of each type, and the regional authorities disagree over the degree of redistribution between 
the two types within each region (intra-regional redistribution). This disagreement leads to an inefficient 
outcome in their model. (The related papers by Wildasin (1991, 1995) are also concerned with 
intra-regional redistribution). The reason for inefficiency in the present model is fundamentally different. 
In the present model all individuals are identical in terms of their abilities before the state of nature is 
revealed; each facing the same probability of being lucky or unlucky. Moreover, both regional authorities 
are in complete agreement as to the degree of redistribution between the lucky and the unlucky within 
their region: both authorities treat the individuals equally, guaranteeing them equal levels of consumption 
in each state. The regional authorities in the present model disagree over the degree of inter-regional 
redistribution when population is imperfectly mobile, each wanting a higher income for all of its own 
residents in every state. (Persson and Tabellini (1996b) also concentrate on interregional redistribution.) 
14At this point it is important to emphasize that the externalities which have been identified in the local 
public economics literature can often be corrected through side payments and enforceable contracts 
between the regions. Enforcement of such contracts, however, would require a powerful central authority. 
In the literature, it is assumed that in the presence of such a powerful central authority these externalities 
will in fact be corrected by direct central intervention. The assumption that is made in the present paper is 
consistent with this literature. 
15Empirical estimates suggest that a substantial portion of the interregional risk sharing in Canada and the 
U.S. is carried out by the central authorities. Eichengreen (1993, pp. 1336-1338) provides a survey of this 
empirical literature. Eichengreen advocates similar risk sharing arrangements for the EU. (Also see 
Eichengreen and Friden (1994, pp. 183-188).) The inefficiency result derived in the present paper 
provides a justification for such a centralised arrangement for interregional risk sharing..   14
  Some extreme cases will serve to further highlight the source of inefficiency in this model. 
First consider the case of an economy with asymmetric regions. Suppose one of the regions (region 1, 
say) is so rich that it makes transfers to region 2 in all the states. Then (16) will hold with equality, 
and (17) with inequality, in all the states. Then (20) will hold at the Nash equilibrium allocation with 
*=1. In this case the degree of inter-regional redistribution (and, hence, of inter-regional risk sharing) 
will be determined by region 1 (the rich region) alone. Region 2 will be essentially passive in the 
game, as in the deterministic model. Thus, in this case strategic interaction between the regions will 
not lead to inefficient degrees of risk sharing. 
  Finally, consider the case of perfect mobility (i.e., when k=0). Then, (16) and (17) will imply 
(20): there will be only one efficient allocation, and the Nash equilibrium will coincide with it. In this 
case the regional authorities know that with free mobility the same level of expected utility will 
prevail throughout the federation. They, thus, do not disagree over the degree of inter-regional 
redistribution; and there is no coordination failure of the type described above.   
 
IV.    The Infinite Horizon Model 
 
  In this section I consider a very simple extension of the model to an infinite horizon setting. 
This will facilitate a discussion of a simple reputation game, and its implication for the ability of the 
regional authorities to sign contracts which will allow them to implement an efficient allocation. 
  Assume that the preferences of individual n are given by   
func { E `` left \{ `` Sum from {t``=``0} to {inf} `` (1`` + `` theta) sup {-t} `` left \[``    U({x}_t^ n ) 
`` + `` {I} sub t sup n    `` right \] `` right\},}    
where x is consumption of the private good by this individual at time 
t, U(@ ) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, 2 is the rate 
of time preference, and I measures the non-pecuniary benefit the 
individual derives solely from its residence in a region. I is equal 
to k(1!n) if this individual resides in region 1 in period t, and it 
is kn if he resides in region 2 in period t. 
  Productivities (i.e., (p1, p2)) are assumed to be intertemporally independent. 
This, together with the fact that there are no predetermined variables in the model, means that the 
value of a variable in any period is independent of its values in other periods. Hence, in most of what   15
follows time subscripts will be suppressed. The sequence of events in each period is as before. 
  In this dynamic setting the choice of the objective function is even harder than before. For the 
sake of simplicity, and in order to draw heavily on the results that have already been derived, I 
assume that in each period regional authority i maximizes Wi. Again, as mentioned above, in the two 
extreme cases of perfect mobility (k=0) and no mobility (k=4) this is the most sensible objective 
function. In the less extreme cases, by maximizing Wi the regional authority i would certainly 
maximize the lifetime utility of its permanent residents!i.e., the agents who decide to reside in the 
region in all states. Furthermore, with relatively mild assumptions about the characteristics of the 
equilibrium outcome, it can be argued that by maximizing Wi the regional authority i will be doing 
its best in order to maximize the expected utility of its median voter in all periods.
16      N e x t  
consider the case in which in a particular period region 1 has experienced a less favourable shock (state ($, 
()). Then, if in the subsequent period the same productivity is experienced all individuals in region 1 
would agree that they would like to receive a larger transfer from 2. On the other hand, if in the 
subsequent period region 1 experiences a more favourable shock, then the conditions outlined above 
would ensure that the existing residents of region 1 would agree on the size of the transfers 1. Thus, in this 
case again, by maximizing W1 in the subsequent period, regional authority 1 will be doing its best in order 
to maximize the expected utility of its median voter.    By the symmetry of the model, similar arguments 
will hold for region 2. 
  If the regional authorities do not care about their reputation, then the policies they will be 
pursuing will be described by (7)!(9). The question is whether in this dynamic setting the regional 
                         
16The details of what is needed for this to be true are as follows. Suppose in a particular period region 1 
has experienced a more favourable shock (i.e., the state is ((, $)), and it has made a transfer to 2, as 
discussed in Section II. Then, the marginal individual in this region (individual N((, $)) would like to see 
a larger transfer; because then it would migrate to region 2 and collect part of the transfer without paying 
for it. Suppose individual N((, $)/2 does not like to see a larger transfer. Then, the majority of voters in 
that region would like to see the same policy if in the next period region 1 continues to experience the 
more favourable outcome. Moreover, if in the next period region 1 experiences a less favourable shock 
(state ($, ()) then that region will be constrained by the condition 1$0. Thus, if in a particular period 
region 1 has experienced a more favourable shock then by maximizing W1 in the subsequent period the 
regional authority will be doing the best it can in order to maximize the expected utility of its median 
voter. 
 
   16
authorities can credibly sign contracts that will allow them to implement an efficient set of policies. 
The efficient allocation we will be concerned with here will be the one that attaches equal weights on 
the objectives of both regional authorities (*=0.5). This will be the allocation most acceptable to both 
authorities, and will also preserve the symmetry of the model.   
  To facilitate a discussion of the sanctions that can be imposed by a regional authority if the 
other authority repudiates the contract, consider the simplest reputation game. Assume that if a 
region (region i, say) that has experienced a more favourable shock does not make the necessary 
transfers for risk sharing, then it will lose its reputation and will never obtain the cooperation of the 
other region (region j). Thus, in that case, if region i does not make the necessary transfers then its 
expected utility for all the following periods will be W (the expected utility with no coordination). 
On the other hand, if the necessary transfers are made then region j will cooperate in all successive 
periods, and the expected utility for region i in all those periods will be W (the expected utility with 
coordination). Thus, the present value of the losses the regional authority i will suffer if it refrains 
from making the necessary transfers in the state in which it experiences a more favourable shock will 
be (W!W)/2. On the other hand, the instantaneous gains from withholding the transfers necessary for 
risk sharing is U()!U(), where    and    are, respectively, consumption per person in region i with and 
without coordination if that region experiences a more favourable shock than the other. Clearly, if 2 
is sufficiently small then the present value of the losses will dominate the instantaneous gains from 
withholding the transfers necessary for risk sharing. In that case, the necessary state contingent 
transfers will be made voluntarily. The regional authorities will then be able to credibly sign 
contracts in order to implement the efficient policies. 
  The next question is whether improvements in the degree of population mobility will make it 
more likely that the regional authorities will be able to commit to an efficient allocation. To answer 
this question first note that as the degree of attachment to home decreases (k falls) the disagreement 
between the regional authorities narrows. This then reduces the gains from risk sharing (W!W). 
Thus, a fall in k reduces the costs to a region of losing reputation (i.e., (W!W)/2) by not making the 
necessary state contingent transfers when it experiences a more favourable shock. On the other hand,   17
as k falls the gains to such a region from withholding the transfers which are over and above those 
without coordination also fall for the following two reasons. First, the size of the transfer that the 
region has to make beyond those without coordination falls with k, because the disagreement 
between the regional authorities narrows. Second, from (12), as k decreases the emigration associated 
with a transfer increases. Thus, both the costs and benefits of withholding the transfers necessary for 
risk sharing fall as the degree of population mobility increases. It is, therefore, not possible to say a 
priori whether improvements in the degree of population mobility will make it more likely that the 
regional authorities will be able to commit to an efficient allocation.   
 Let  [W!W]/[U()!U()] be the critical value 2* such that if 2<2* then the efficient allocation 
will be implemented by the regional authorities. The above reasoning suggests that 2* will be a 
non-monotonic function of k. Numerical evaluations of the model indicate that 2* is highly 
non-monotonic is k (see the Appendix.)   
V. Conclusions 
  This paper has considered the issue of risk sharing in a federation with population mobility. It 
was shown that there is some scope for inter-regional risk sharing that is not fully exploited by the 
regional authorities when population is only imperfectly mobile. Intra-regional risk sharing is, 
however, perfect even with decentralisation. It was also shown that in the infinite horizon setting the 
regional authorities may credibly commit to an efficient set of state contingent policies without any 
need for central intervention. Surprisingly, improvements in the degree of population mobility may 
make such commitments less likely.   
  There are various directions in which this basic model could be extended. The reputation 
game that was used in this paper was the simplest possible game. More elaborate games have been 
used with regard to monetary and fiscal policies!see Persson and Tabellini (1990). One could allow 
the regional authorities to run budget deficits. The technological shocks were assumed to be 
intertemporally independent. It would be interesting to work out the importance of policy 
coordination when shocks persist. Finally, it would be fruitful to consider the possibility of capital 
accumulation. This would add a predetermined variable to the model, and also allow the possibility   18
of capital tax competition.     19
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Appendix A 
  In this appendix, I describe the procedure for a numerical evaluation of the effects of 
improvements in the degree of population mobility on the likelihood of the regional authorities being 
able to successfully commit to the efficient allocation which places equal weights on the objective 
functions of the two regional authorities.   
  I assume that the function R(") is of the simple form   
R(i)=!/"   (A.1) 
while the utility function is 
func{ U    ( b tilde sub i ) `` = `` log ( b tilde sub i )   
. 
}    (A.2) 
 In  Appendix  B,  I  show  that  with  perfect  population  mobility  (k=0) 
if R(") is given by (A.1) then no region will make an inter-regional 
transfer. From this, one can conclude that with (A.1) there will be 
no inter-regional transfers for any value of k. The reason is that 
as  k  increases  the  incentives  of  the  richer  regional  authority  to  make 
inter-regional transfers are weakened. If at k=0 the rich regional 
authority does not make transfers, then they will not make transfers 
with k>0.  
  The numerical examples are consistent with the preceding 
proposition. In the numerical example, I set "=0.5, p1=0.95, p2=0.7, and 
B=0.5. With p1>p2 we must have 2=0. Now note that from equations (2), (5) and (15)   
func{ b tilde sub 1 `` = `` p sub 1 ` psi (N tilde ) `+ ` {S tilde sub 2 ` - ` S tilde sub 1} over {N tilde } 
~~~~~~~~ a n d ~~~~~~~~    b tilde sub 2 `` =`` p sub 2 ` psi (1`-`N tilde )` + ` {S tilde sub 1 ` - ` S 
tilde sub 2} over {1 `- `N tilde }. 
}(A.3) 
  Next, note that if 1>0 then (16) would hold with equality; and the solution for    and 1 
would be given by (16) (with equality), (13), (14), (A.3) and (4). The numerical solution to these 
equations, however, give us 1<0. These solutions are, therefore, consistent with the above proposition 
that with (A.1) no region will make a transfer regardless of the degree of population mobility. 
  Equipped with this result, we can obtain the value of    in the Nash equilibrium by simply   22
setting 1=2=0, and then substituting for 1 and 2 from (A.3) into (4). Once    is obtained as a solution to 
(4), we can substitute it back into (A.3) and obtain the Nash equilibrium levels of 1 and 2. Henceforth, 
call these    and . Because the model is symmetric, the values of 1 and 2 for when p1=0.7 and p2=0.95 
can be obtained by switching    and . We can, thus, calculate the expected values of instantaneous 
utility without cooperation, W and W. 
  In order to obtain the cooperative solution, first set 1!2= in (A.3). Then solve    (20) (with 
*=0.5), (13), (14), (A.3) and (4) for    and . After this, substitute for    and    into (A.3) in order to 
obtain the values of 1 and 2 with cooperation. Henceforth, call these    and . Because the model is 
symmetric, the values of 1 and 2 for when p1=0.7 and p2=0.95 can be obtained by switching    and . 
We can, thus, calculate the expected value of instantaneous utility with cooperation, W and W. 
  We are now in a position to calculate   
2*=[W!W]/[U()!U()], 
and plot the values of 2* against k.   
  We can see that the resulting plot is highly non-monotonic, especially when k is small (i.e., 
when population is more mobile). The numerical results also show that when k is very large 2* tends 
towards 0. Hence, it is hard to implement the efficient outcome when population is not mobile.   23
Appendix B 
  In this appendix, I prove that if the function R(") is of the simple form   
R(i)=!/"   (B.1) 
then with perfect mobility (k=0) in the Nash equilibrium no region will make a transfer to the other 
region. To prove this, first note that with perfect mobility the migration equilibrium condition (4) 
implies that we should have   
1 = 2.  (B.2) 
  With perfect mobility the conditions (16) and (17) reduce to 
func{ {Lambda tilde sub 1 } over { 1 `` - `` N tilde } `` {U'( b tilde sub 2 ) }    `` = `` {    Lambda 
tilde sub 2}    over { N tilde }    `{U'( b tilde sub 1 ) ~ } . }   (B.3) 
Now note that from equations (2), (5) and (15)  
func{ b tilde sub 1 `` = `` p sub 1 ` psi (N tilde ) `+ ` {S tilde 
sub 2 ` - ` S tilde sub 1} over {N tilde } ~~~~~~~~ a n d ~~~~~~~~  
b tilde sub 2 `` =`` p sub 2 ` psi (1`-`N tilde )` + ` {S tilde sub 
1 ` - ` S tilde sub 2} over {1 `- `N tilde }. 
}(B.4) 
 Suppose  p1>p2. In that case, we know that =0. Substituting from (B.4) into (B.2) and (B.3), 
we will get two equations in two unknowns, 1 and . If R(") is given by (B.1), then it follows that both 
(B.2) and (B.3) will be satisfied with 1==0, and with    given by 
p1
"  =   p 2(1!)
".   (B.5) 
 Similarly,  if  p2>p1 then with perfect mobility (k=0), and with (B.1), at the Nash equilibrium 
we will have 1==0, and    given by (B.5). One can conclude that if (B.1) holds then at the Nash 
equilibrium there will not be any interregional transfers with perfect mobility (k=0).     24
 Values  of  2* for Different k 
 
        k                         2* 
 
  0.4000000E-03         0.5920286E-04 
  0.4500000E-03         0.6657890E-04 
  0.5000000E-03         0.5001479 
  0.5500000E-03         0.5001627 
  0.6000000E-03         0.8875749E-04 
  0.6500000E-03          1.000288 
  0.7000000E-03         0.1035103E-03 
  0.7500000E-03          1.000333 
  0.8000000E-03         0.2501774 
  0.8500000E-03         0.1256908E-03 
  0.9000000E-03         0.5002661 
  0.9500000E-03         0.5002809 
  0.1000000E-02         0.1668637 
  0.1050000E-02         0.3335919 
  0.1100000E-02         0.2502438 
  0.1150000E-02         0.2002379 
  0.1200000E-02         0.3002836 
  0.1250000E-02         0.2002585 
  0.1300000E-02         0.3003072 
  0.1350000E-02         0.2502991 
  0.1400000E-02         0.2503101 
  0.1450000E-02         0.3336901 
  0.1500000E-02         0.2860623 
  0.1550000E-02         0.2503432 
  0.1600000E-02         0.3128838 
  0.1650000E-02         0.2781567 
  0.1700000E-02         0.2781681 
  0.1750000E-02         0.2503874 
  0.1800000E-02         0.2503984 
  0.1850000E-02         0.2731491 
  0.1900000E-02         0.3186405 
  0.1950000E-02         0.2504315 
  0.2000000E-02         0.2696846 
  0.2050000E-02         0.3081807 
  0.2100000E-02         0.2862009 
  0.2150000E-02         0.3219494 
  0.2200000E-02         0.3219614 
  0.2250000E-02         0.2504975 
  0.2300000E-02         0.2817797 
  0.2350000E-02         0.2652356 
  0.2400000E-02         0.3241119 
  0.2450000E-02         0.2637089 
  0.2500000E-02         0.2900552 
  0.2550000E-02         0.3006011 
  0.2600000E-02         0.2863161   25
  0.2650000E-02         0.2863276 
  0.2700000E-02         0.2614746 
  0.2750000E-02         0.2832425 
  0.2800000E-02         0.2606266 
  0.2850000E-02         0.3006713 
  0.2900000E-02         0.2599075 
  0.2950000E-02         0.2784532 
  0.3000000E-02         0.2685351 
  0.3050000E-02         0.2765585 
  0.3100000E-02         0.2840480 
  0.3150000E-02         0.2910551 
  0.3200000E-02         0.2663459 
  0.3250000E-02         0.2734661 
  0.3300000E-02         0.2801684 
  0.3350000E-02         0.2721887 
  0.3400000E-02         0.2785554 
  0.3450000E-02         0.2845790 
  0.3500000E-02         0.2771147 
  0.3550000E-02         0.2828675 
  0.3600000E-02         0.2691058 
  0.3650000E-02         0.2935334 
  0.3700000E-02         0.2865687 
  0.3750000E-02         0.2622027 
  0.3800000E-02         0.2786463 
  0.3850000E-02         0.2897813 
  0.3900000E-02         0.2774856 
  0.3950000E-02         0.2821565 
  0.4000000E-02         0.2866374 
  0.4050000E-02         0.2754311 
  0.4100000E-02         0.2797839 
  0.4150000E-02         0.2839730 
  0.4200000E-02         0.2880075 
  0.4250000E-02         0.2777549 
  0.4300000E-02         0.2904702 
  0.4350000E-02         0.2854843 
  0.4400000E-02         0.2843449 
  0.4450000E-02         0.2879128 
  0.4500000E-02         0.2913661 
  0.4550000E-02         0.2822929 
  0.4600000E-02         0.2856742 
  0.4650000E-02         0.2889535 
  0.4700000E-02         0.2764311 
  0.4750000E-02         0.2796560 
  0.4800000E-02         0.2827904 
  0.4850000E-02         0.2858381 
  0.4900000E-02         0.2888027 
  0.4950000E-02         0.2774422 
  0.5000000E-02         0.2803628 
  0.5050000E-02         0.2896285   26
  0.5100000E-02         0.2923216 
  0.5150000E-02         0.2913157 
  0.5200000E-02         0.2843257 
  0.5250000E-02         0.2928843 
  0.5300000E-02         0.2770666 
  0.5350000E-02         0.2853196 
  0.5400000E-02         0.2821338 
  0.5450000E-02         0.2869683 
  0.5500000E-02         0.2893125 
  0.5550000E-02         0.2885132 
  0.5600000E-02         0.2825308 
  0.5650000E-02         0.2819032 
  0.5700000E-02         0.2813012 
  0.5750000E-02         0.2834944 
  0.5800000E-02         0.2801680 
  0.5850000E-02         0.2822891 
  0.5900000E-02         0.2817208 
  0.5950000E-02         0.2837692 
  0.6000000E-02         0.2877437 
  0.6050000E-02         0.2826323 
  0.6100000E-02         0.2820944 
  0.6150000E-02         0.2772573 
  0.6200000E-02         0.2853193 
  0.6250000E-02         0.2829406 
  0.6300000E-02         0.2865698 
  0.6350000E-02         0.2860090 
  0.6400000E-02         0.2877610 
  0.6450000E-02         0.2788089 
  0.6500000E-02         0.2844327 
  0.6550000E-02         0.2877642 
  0.6600000E-02         0.2834625 
  0.6650000E-02         0.2867103 
  0.6700000E-02         0.2825502 
  0.6750000E-02         0.2857185 
  0.6800000E-02         0.2816909 
  0.6850000E-02         0.2847832 
  0.6900000E-02         0.2843354 
  0.6950000E-02         0.2839001 
  0.7000000E-02         0.2834767 
  0.7050000E-02         0.2863829 
  0.7100000E-02         0.2840888 
  0.7150000E-02         0.2836829 
  0.7200000E-02         0.2832876 
  0.7250000E-02         0.2860340 
  0.7300000E-02         0.2808002 
  0.7350000E-02         0.2882717 
  0.7400000E-02         0.2831236 
  0.7450000E-02         0.2827619 
  0.7500000E-02         0.2824090   27
  Values of 2* for Large k 
 
 
       k                   2* 
 
   1.000000          0.1777427 
   2.000000          0.1444939 
   3.000000          0.1283825 
   4.000000          0.1188946 
   5.000000          0.1126446 
                  .  
                  .  
                  .  
   10.00000          0.9866853E-01 
   11.00000          0.9728818E-01 
   12.00000          0.9612200E-01 
   13.00000          0.9512535E-01 
   14.00000          0.9426250E-01 
   15.00000          0.9350840E-01 
                  .  
                  .  
                  .  
   95.00000          0.8416210E-01 
   96.00000          0.8414280E-01 
   97.00000          0.8412433E-01 
   98.00000          0.8410604E-01 
   99.00000          0.8408775E-01 
   100.0000          0.8407001E-01 
 
 
 